Introduction
Designing a good system of incentives is a problem that has been with us for a long time.
In principle such a system ought to encourage individuals to do what is right by rewarding them for carrying out socially desirable policies. Unfortunately it is not easy to make an incentive system which is altogether flawless.
Sometimes the defects are not evident at first, but they almost always make themselves known eventually.
While the incentive problem is by no means unique to a planned economy, it does take on special relevance in that context. Soviet planners have had mixed degrees of success in grappling with it over the years.
Just recently there has been a major reform of the Soviet incentive structure.
The new system is quite unlike what went before. It is relatively sophisticated and has some intriguing properties. My hope is that an analysis of the Soviet model may be of interest to a wide audience, since similar problems of motivation and coordination occur in many contexts.
This reform was intended to be instituted during the Ninth Five Year Plan and was inaugurated in 1971. Conversion over to it seems to have been spread throughout the plan period, and there are reports even now of enterprises changing over. An excellent survey of the new reform, as well as of the background to it, is given in Berliner [1974] . Veselkov [1968] contains a good description of the preceeding debate about incentive systems. One of the earliest proposals was that of Liberman [1962] . In what follows we implicitly assume that inputs and the product mix are fixed, so that the issue of changing them does not arise.
(and the planners are never really sure, beforehand, what it ought to be).
A target which is set too low will not ordinarily lure enterprise managers to overfulfill by a conspicuous margin because next period's plan target will start off with this period's performance as a point of departure (the well-known "ratchet principle" Manove [1973] and Weitzman [1971] contain discussions of this problem.
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Many problems or difficulties would remain of course, but I think it is fair to say that they are less compelling than the basic contradiction between 1) and 2). their potential in seeking low assignments. Analytically the new system works as follows.
There are three stages.
In the first or preliminary phase the planners (on the basis of their own best current knowledge) assign to the enterprise a tentative target y and a tentative bonus fund B for meeting that target.
Also made available is a set of bonus coefficients a, B, y whose role will be explained.
In the second or planning phase, the enterprise has the option of selecting a larger (or smaller) plan target y with a correspondingly larger (or smaller) planned bonus fund for meeting it, B, according to the formula:
However B is only the planned bonus fund (which the enterprise would receive^f it actually ended up producing the targeted amount y) .
In the third or implementation stage, when the enterprise ends up producing amount y it actually receives the bonus fund The fond material 'nogo pooshchreniia , which can be used for a variety of purposes, including paying out bonuses to managers and workers.
See
Berliner [1974] for more details.
In principle the numbers for each year are all set at the beginning of the five year plan and are intended not to be changed later.
It remains an open question what is supposed to happen, e.g., if the planners see that the situation has changed. in consultation with the enterprise. Now they are selected by the enterprise according to the multi-stage procedure just outlined. First note that if the enterprise knows for sure how much y can be produced, it will always get the maximum bonus by setting y equal to that value. So there is an incentive to be truthful in this case.
Now suppose a small amount of uncertainty in y, small enough to permit us to use the expected value hypothesis. The probability density function of y is f(y).
By hypothesis, the enterprise will choose y to maximize the expected bonus:
-CO y Differentiating (4) with respect to y and setting the result equal to zero yields (after cancelling out terms) Q Veselkov [1973] , for example, lays great stress on it.
-oo y Using the fact that J f(y)dy = 1, the above expression becomes p (y>y) =^f >
where P(y>y) = J^f (y)dy. y Thus, the optimal self-selected target is such that the probability of ex-post plan fulfillment is the ratio of the difference in the coefficients As of the moment, there seems to be no evidence that Soviet planners have seriously analyzed how the incentive coefficients ought to be' set.
We could complicate the model by including such things as "effort", but it really wouldn't add significantly to an understanding of the new incentive system. Likewise for analyzing several different targets (gross output, profitability, labor productivity) simultaneously imposed.
My own tentative conclusion is that the new Soviet incentive model looks like a clever innovation. And it seems to have some nice theoretical
